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a matter of policy to refuse a discharge would penalize the
bankrupt and prevent him from starting afresh, from his
business misfortunes. It is true that one of the avowed pur-
poses of the Bankruptcy Act is to discharge the indebtedness
of the honest debtor so that he will be permitted to start
afresh in his economic pursuits.15  Courts have held that the
Act is to be sensibly construed in favor of the honest bank-
rupt and his release.16 However, it is submitted that the
result reached by the Circuit Court in the principal case is
the only tenable interpretation under the Bankruptcy Act,
wholly apart from matters of policy.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
An employee of an Illinois Corporation, hired in Illinois,
was injured in the course of his employment in Wisconsin.
The employee received a Workmen's Compensation award
from his employer under the Illinois statute. This award
contained a specific provision that no rights were to be af-
fected which the employee might have under the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Wisconsin. Then the employee applied
for compensation under the Wisconsin Act. The Wisconsi
Supreme Court' under the authority of Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v Hunts set aside the Wisconsin order allowing compen-
sation, finding that under the full faith and credit clauses
of the Federal Constitution that the Wisconsin proceedings
were barred by the Illinois awad. On certiorari to the Su-
preme Court the Wisconsin judgment was reversed; since the
Illinois award was not intended to be conclusive of the em-
ployee's rights in Wisconsin, the Wisconsin award was not
barred by the Illinois award. Industrial Commission of Wis-
consin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
The requirement of the Constitution for one state to
15. H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
16. Williams v. U.S. Fidelity Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915).
1. 248 Wis. 570, 22 N.W.2d 522 (1946).
2. 320 U.S. 430, 150 A.L.R. 413 (1943).
3. U.S. Const. Art. IV, §1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each state to the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings
of every State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and Effect thereof."
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give the same faith and credit to judicial proceedings and
statutes as would be given in the state where rendered has
been a rigid limitation upon the state courts' refusing to rec-
ognize judgments or statutes of sister states.' Few excep-
tions to the mandate of the Constitution have been allowed.5
In Workmen's Compensation cases where the interests of two
states are involved (the state where the injury occurred and
the state of the employment contract and residence of the
injured worker) either state has been allowed to apply its
own Workmen's Compensation Act as of the first instance,
giving no effect to the statute of the other state., However,
the Supreme Court had held in Magnolia Petroleum Co. V.
Hunt, that once one of the states had allowed an award under
its own laws the second state was precluded from allowing
an additional award because it must give full faith and credit
to the award of the first state. The situation in the Mag-
nolia case was essentially the same as that presented in the
principal case. However there was no provision in the Texas
award in the Magnolia case, as in the Illinois award in the
4. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 462 (1940); Roche v. McDonald, 275
U.S. 452 (1927); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 15 (1909); Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). In both the Magnolia and McCartin
cases, an award by a state board is considered to be a judicial pro-
ceeding.
5. The exceptions have been developed under these circumstances:
(a) Lack of jurisdiction of rendering court, Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 314
U.S. 201 (1940). (b) Penal Laws, Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co.,
127 U.S. 265 (1887). (c) Denial of use of courts, Anglo-American
Provision Co. v. Davis Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903). See Stone, J.,
dissenting in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 216 (1933).
6. Pacific Mutual Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 306 U.S. 493
(1939); Alaska Packers Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 U.S. 532
(1935).
7. 320 U.S. 430 (1943). In this case, Hunt, a Louisiana resident em-
ployed in Louisiana by defendant Oil Co. was injured while at work
for the Co. in Texas. The Texas Workmen's Compensation made
an award to him under the Texas statute. After his return home
to Louisiana, Hunt learned that the Louisiana statute gave a great-
er compensation than Texas and filed a claim against the employer
in Louisiana. The Supreme Court held in reversing the Louisiana
court which had allowed compensation that under the full faith and
credit requirement the measure of credit was that given by Texas
to the award in Texas.
State courts have generally followed the precedent of the Mag-
nolia case: Butler v. Lee Bros. Trucking Contractors, 206 Ark. 885,
178 S.W.2d 58 (1944); People v. Chicago Lloyds, 391 Ill. 500, 63
N.E.2d 484 (1945); Mizrahi's Case, 71 N.E.2d, 383 (Mass. 1947);
Overcash v. Yellow Transit Co., 352 Mo. 1002, 180 S.W.2d, 683
(1944); but cf. Loudenslager v. Gorum, 195 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1946).
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principal case, to the effect that settlement was being made
only of the employee's rights existing in the state granting the
award.8 According to the opinion in the principal case the
first award in the Magnolia case was "made explicitly in lieu
of any other recovery for the injury to the employee, preclud-
ing even a recovery under the laws of another state."9 It is
doubtful whether the Magnolia case actually embraced such
a finding.1 0 The difference in the effects given to the awards
in the two cases is indeed tenuous, considering the wording
of the statutes in the two cases.1 ' It was this difference
in the effect of the awards, however, that the Court seized
upon to secure a different result in the principal case. Wis-
consin need give the Illinois award no more credit than Illi-
nois would, and the Illinois award had expressly stated it was
not settling any rights under the Wisconsin Act.
The result in the Magnolia case has been criticized since
the time of its decision. The party seeking relief was an
injured workman, a member of a necessitous class. Such
a class in many fields has received special treatment.12 Also,
the state where the workman was injured has a special inter-
est in seeing that the workman is adequately provided for.
8. "This settlement does not affect any rights that applicant may have
under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state of Wisconsin."
330 U.S. 622, 629.
9. 330 U.S. 622, 626.
10. 320 U.S. 430, 440: "But whether the Texas award purported also to
adjudicate the rights and duties of the parties under the Louisiana
law or to control persons and courts in Louisiana is irrelevant to
our present inquiry. . . The significant question in this case
is whether the full faith and credit clause has deprived Louisiana
of the power to deny that the Texas award has the same binding
effect on the parties in Louisiana as it has in Texas."
11. The Illinois statute seems to say nothing one way or the othei
about being exclusive as to all rights. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd,
1927) c.48 §143: "No common law or statutory right to recover
damage for injury or death sustained by an employee while en-
gaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the
compensation herein provided, shall be available to any employee
who is covered by the provision of this act." The Court in the
principal case presumed the statute to mean only Illinois rights
and this presumption was enhanced by the provision in the Illinois
award that no rights under the Wisconsin statute were affected.
The Texas statute approximates the Illinois statute. Texas
Stat., Rev. Civ. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 8306, §3: "The employees
shall have no right of action against their employer . . . for
damages for personal injuries . . . but such employees . . . shall
look for compensation solely to the association, as the same is here-
inafter provided for."
12. Cheatham, "Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause-
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt" 44 Col. L. Rev. 330, 343 (1944).
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There should be a relaxation of the full faith and credit clause
when a state has a strong special interest which cannot be
passed upon by another state.13 In addition, there is a distinc-
tion between transitory tort actions and Workmen's Compen-
sation proceedings so far as full faith and credit is concerned.14
Awards of Workmen's Compensation are rendered by admin-
istrative boards. These boards cannot apply the statute of
another state as can a court apply the tort law of another
state in a tort case where these is an extra-state element.
A further criticism is that the employer is given an oppor-
tunity to take advantage of the injured employee. The em-
ployer is likely to be better informed than the employee on
the various state statutes and may urge an early award in
the state which will grant the lowest amount of compensa-
tion.1 5
The dominant objective of the full faith and credit clause
is to secure uniformity once there has been final adjudication
of a person's rights; on the other hand, Workmen's Compen-
sation is only partial indemnification for the loss sustained
by an injured employee. Therefore a decision must be made
as to which shall have greater weight, the "unifying force" '
of the principal that a judgment shall have the same credit
in all states as it has in the state where rendered; or the
view that "uniformity is not the highest value in the law of
Workmen's Compensation"'7 and each state has an economic
interest in determining the support needed for its injured
citizens. 8  It would be socially desirable to permit an em-
13. Id. at 344. This special interest is analogous to the interest a state
has in the support of a minor child. See Stone, J., dissenting in
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 216 (1933).
14. Cheatham, supra m12, at 344; Freund, "Chief Justice Stone and the
Conflict of Laws" 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1229 (1946). The majority
in the Magnolia case treated the case the same as when any tort
claimant seeks to disregard a judgment and sue in another state
under a more favorable law.
15. Cheatham, supra n.12, at 345.
16. Stone, C.J., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439(1943).
17. Black, J., dissenting in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S.
430, 459 (1943).
18. Restatement "Conflict of Laws" (1934) §403 adopts the latter
view: "Award already had under the Workmen's Compensation
Act of another state will not bar a proceeding under an ap-
plicable act, but the amount paid on a prior award will be credited
on the second award." See Dwan, "Workmen's Compensation and
Conflict of Laws" 20 Minn L. Rev. 19 (1935); 2 Beale, "The Con-
flict of Laws" (1935) §403.1; Dodd, "Administration of Workmen's
19481
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ployee to recover the maximum amount possible under any
applicable acts. The principal case reflects the Court's ten-
dency to recognize the unique status of Workmen's Compensa-
tion and to relax the rigidity of the requirement of full faith
and credit in that field.19
The result in the principal case should be a warning to
employees in the future who are injured in a situation where
two states have an interest. The employees should see that
an award by one state includes a specific provision that the
award does not purport to settle any rights the employee
may have under the statute of the other state. Even if a
specific provision is not included, -however, the Court seems
disposed toward interpreting the scope of a state Workmen's
.Compensation award as settling rights under that state alone
so that a second state may grant an award under its own
statute without violating the full faith and credit clause. In
a case where it is found, however, that the first state's award
was meant to be conclusive of all rights everywhere, in view
of the forceful policy considerations for treating Workmen's
Compensation apart from other fields, the Court may allow
both awards to stand anyway. The Court might say, as
Chief Justice Stone did in the Magnolia case,2 0 that for a
state proceeding to be conclusive of all rights everywhere
would be giving unconstitutional and extraterritorial effect
to that state's proceedings.
Compensation" (1936) 819, 820; Freund's "Chief Justice Stone and
the Conflict of Laws" 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1210 (1946).
Dramatic illustration of the conflicting principals is afforded
by two cases. Rounsaville v. Central R.R., 87 N.J.L. 371, 94 Atl.
392 (1915): "Recovery of compensation in two states is no more il-
legal and not necessarily more unjust than recovery upon two po-
licies of accident or life insurance." (dicta); and Hughey v. Ware,
34 N.M. 29, 276 Pac. 27 (1929). In speaking of the Rounsaville
case, the New Mexico Court said: "The analogy is false. Public
policy has not concerned itself with the amount of accident insur-
ance one may carry at his own expense. It (public policy) is con-
cerned with the amount of compensation because the cost there is
passed on to the consuming public."
19. The McCartin case could be regarded as holding only that a court
may specifically limit its judgment so that it will not be resjudicata as to certain matters, since the Court emphasized the pro-
vision of the Illinois award that the rights of the employee under
the Wisconsin statutes were not affected, and paid little attention
to the Illinois statute. See Dutton, "Characterization, Res Judicata
and the Lawyer's Clause," 22 Ind. L. J. 201, 216, n.51. However, it
- is believed the Court did not intend such a narrow interpretation
to be given to its holding.
20. 320 U.S. 430, 440. "For Texas is without power to give extra-
territorial effect to its laws."
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